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This study analyzed the influence of structural change on GDP convergence in Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay (ABU) in the context of a Keynesian model with balance of 
payments constraints. Empirical evidence suggested that income and structural 
convergence were associated in the post-II World War period. The differences in 
industrial and economic policies in ABU may have contributed to explain the intensity of 
the process of structural change in these countries. ABU exhibited a different ability to 
reshape their institutions with a view to encouraging industrial transformation. The 
Brazilian industrial policy seems to have been more efficient in promoting structural 
convergence. 
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I - Introduction 
 
There are many studies that analyze the cross-country income convergence in 
developing and developed countries. Many of them emphasize the role of technological, 
economical and institutional changes in the convergence process, whereas others consider 
not only such factors, but also the role of the international trade, where the international 
linkages are exactly what drive the convergence process. Actually, both approaches are 
used in this study, using a Thirlwall’s North-South Model as a theoretical background. 
The idea that the international specialization of a country can affect its long-term 
rate of growth is controversial among economists. In many studies, the impact of 
international specialization on growth is related to both supply-side and demand-side 
forces. From a supply-side perspective, some sectors offer higher technological 
opportunities and more external economies than others (Dosi, 1984). On the demand side, 
some sectors display a larger participation in total demand and higher income elasticity of 
demand than others (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994). Therefore, countries specialized in 
these sectors will benefit from higher rates of productivity growth and/or effective 
demand growth.  
The main goal of this study is to make some insights about the income 
convergence in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (ABU), through some stylized facts using 
the important linkages among these South American trade partners. The approach used 
here will be only an attempt to explain some important changes in the income 
convergence in these countries, mainly due to some structural and political changes in the 
period of 1963 to 1991.  
The paper presents the evolution of income convergence in terms of GDP per 
capita and structural convergence (convergence of the industrial structure) between the 
ABU countries and a group of developed countries. It also discusses the influence of 
structural change on GDP convergence/divergence in the context of a Keynesian model 
with balance of payments constraints. This model suggests that structural change affects 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank CAPES Foundation (Brazil) for the financial support.  3 
growth by increasing the "non-price competitiveness" of the country, which broadens the 
scope for intra-industry trade and eases the balance of payments constraint on growth. 
Finally, the main conclusions of the work are summarized. 
 
II - Some Important Insights 
 
  According to Stiglitz (1989), the explanation about the differences among 
developed and less developed countries (LDCs) is not simply due to lack of human and 
nonhuman capital. The explanation can be due to differences in economic organization, 
to how factors of production interact and to institutions that mediate these interactions, 
where markets are the most important of institutions. But markets are not perfect, and so 
they present many failures that account against the convergence between LDCs and 
developed countries. Then, the government intervention has an important role to play 
against such market failures. As Binswanger (1997) states, the government could reduce 
the transaction costs by providing public goods, such as impersonal rules of exchange and 
institutions that enforce laws.  
  The analysis about the causes of the income gap between LDCs and developed 
countries is very complex and involves many important socio-economic variables. As 
Stiglitz (1989) cited
2, learning and information are very critical determinants of these 
income gaps. The discussion becomes more complete when we add some specific 
distortions on the economic organization that either developed and LDCs face. The 
LDC’s have more difficulties on the learning by doing process and also in the learning 
transfers from developed countries, resulting in specialization in technologies and 
products with lower learning potentials. The presence of the learning heterogeneity 
implies in imperfect markets, where the first entrants will get monopoly rents, causing 
increasing income differentials. 
  Another interesting characteristic of the income convergence among countries is 
the historical events that affected the development of many nations. As Stiglitz (1989) 
mentioned, particular historical events, such as wars, depressions, plagues, etc, have 
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externalities, multiple equilibria, and so on.  4 
permanent effects. It is, then, a contrast with the Solow’s growth model, where the 
economy convergence is independent of initial conditions or historical events. Solow 
(1985) argued that the economic theory does not have anything to learn from economic 
history. But it is clear that path-dependence and historical events matter in economic 
theory in general, and in the growth theory in particular. Another example that stress the 
historical importance in the growth rate of a country is the study of Reynolds (1983), 
which analyzes what he called “chronology of turning points”, important historical events 
that were important starting points for the subsequent development in many countries. 
Another example that history matters can be found in David (1985) and Arthur (1989), 
where the path-dependence was highlighted in technological development and industrial 
location in developed countries. 
  The presence of asymmetric information and externalities imply market failures 
and necessity of government intervention
3. Stiglitz (1989) says that imperfect and costly 
information problem can explain more why LDCs have a lower income level than does 
the endowment of factors. Therefore, the organization of the markets plays an important 
role in the income convergence of LDCs. Some of the ways developed countries reduce 
the market failures effects through nonmarket institutions, such as large firms, may be 
less effective in LDCs. Under Stiglitz perspective, the presence of a National planning is 
not enough to prevent problems with market imperfections in the capital, labor and 
product markets. Empirical findings such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) says that if 
there is technological differences across economies, than mobility of capital can create 
divergence of per capita output and capital stocks. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand and to know the microeconomics of LDCs, focusing on the rural and 
industrial organizations of these countries.  
  
III - Income and Structural Convergence and International Trade    
 
  Without lose the insights given in the previous section, now we can turn to the 
relationship between trade and income convergence. 
                                                 
3 A good reading in this topic is Stiglitz (1974).   5 
  According to Bardhan (1993), many arguments used in support of protection in 
developing countries gave rise to the theory of economic policy under “domestic 
distortions” on the international trade literature. Popular arguments for protection with a 
view to curbing luxury consumption of the rich in poor countries using a trade restriction 
is not a first-best policy action, since the first-best policy would be a consumption tax on 
luxuries. Another example is the reduction of income inequality, where the best policy is 
not the tariff on luxuries but the progressive income and wealth taxation. This viewpoint 
can be generalized simply saying that departures from the usual marginal conditions of 
Pareto-efficiency are best tackled by using policy instruments that act most directly on 
the relevant margin. 
  The import substitution policy adopted for many LDCs during the 1950s and 
1960s was an important instrument used to protect the domestic markets, and to stimulate 
the structural changes necessary to give these countries the required conditions to 
industrialize and improve their economies. Bruton (1998) argues that this behavior was 
motivated by the view that the market kept the poor countries poor and rich countries 
rich. Therefore, the secular deterioration of the terms of trade of LDCs, problems with the 
balance of payments and the possibility of having the growth stopped or stagnated, were 
some of the arguments used for these countries to implement import substitution policies. 
Another view of the import substitution is that this policy was used in a way of 
replicating the high-income developed countries, producing at home what was primarily 
imported from rich countries.  Many countries that used import substitution policy used 
tariffs and exchange rates as main tools to perform such policy. There were different 
consequences from this policy, resulting in market distortions that were not properly 
corrected through the right instruments, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. For 
instance, a common type of distortion was the tendency of wages to rise, particularly in 
the formal sectors. In Latin America, wages rates were raised or allowed to rise as a 
matter of government policy aimed to affect the distribution of income.  
  In general, the import substitution policies aimed to help the structural changes 
necessary to improve the LDCs economies were not successfully implemented. The 
policy created externalities and distortions that resulted in frustrated attempts to reduce 
their consequences. The agriculture sector, for example, was penalized in order to finance  6 
the new manufacturing activities. We can say that the main consequences of the import 
substitution policy were the use of quotas, exchange controls, overvalued exchange rates 
that contributed to unemployment and underutilization of capital, the penalization of the 
exports, and a difficult wage-setting situation. The justification was that once the 
structure of the economy was changed, learning would occur automatically and resolve 
the difficulties. But as we pointed out before, learning was more difficult
4.      
  Looking at to some basic concepts in international trade, we can come up with an 
important theorem that helps to understand the role of international trade in the income 
convergence. This theorem is the Factor Price Equalization Theorem (FPE), which is 
important to explain that free trade in some goods can equalize factor prices across 
countries. Ben-David (1993) examined the specific role of the trade liberalization within 
groups of countries relating trade’s impact on income convergence through the FPE. We 
can see that in Ben-David (1996) groups of countries that trade with each other tend to 
have a significant income convergence, with the FPE just corroborating the intuition of 
Heckscher-Ohlin that trade play an equalizing role.  
Fischer and Serra (1996) found that in presence of externalities in each country 
(developed and less developed), trade leads to factor price equalization. Trade reduces the 
growth rate in the developed country, which is explained by factor prices change due to 
trade. Since expenditure in education enters each agent’s utility function and trade raises 
the relative price of human capital in the rich country, less education is provided to 
descendants. As trade leads wealthy people to save a large proportion of total savings, 
and the externality causes their savings to be less productive, growth suffers. The 
distributional consequence is that trade reduces the rate at the inequality declines. If the 
poor country has no more inequality than the rich country, the poor country grows faster.  
These authors considered in their analysis a presence of externalities in the production of 
                                                 
4 Of course that the import substitution policy also caused many improvements in some LDCs, such as 
more variability in the exports, increase in the life expectancy at birth, increase in the growth rate, 
manufacturing increased as a proportion of GDP (Bruton, 1998). But the price distortions, poverty, income 
inequality problems and misuse of resources overcome all the improvements from the import substitution 
policy.    7 
human capital and income inequality. They conclude that trade will result in inequality 
disappearance and income convergence in the long run
5.       
But the use of FPE to explain income convergence has some problems, since the 
FPE theorem describes just the free trade equilibrium, without mention anything about 
the  dynamics  of  this  process.    One alternative to this problem would be the dynamic 
analogue of the FPE theorem, called Factor-Price Convergence Theorem (FPC) by 
Leamer (1995), which says that when two countries eliminate the trade barriers, good 
price equalization eliminates factor price gaps. But this approach has problems as well. 
There are many assumptions that have to be satisfied to validate both theorems
6. Then, 
even if the FPC theorem is leading to convergence of factor prices, income can be 
diverging if the endowments between two countries are too different. 
  The international trade could be an important cause of income convergence if we 
consider the international flows of technology. The problem is if we try to link the 
income convergence with the trade of technology, which the income depends not only on 
factor prices but also factor quantities. 
  A variation of the flows of technology could be the flows of capital goods. Capital 
goods trade affects a country’s income through its endowments of factor quantities. But 
there is nothing that guarantees that factor prices across countries are converging or 
diverging at the same rate. 
  There are many other attempts to relate the income convergence with 
international trade. Some of them are less orthodox than others. For instance, we can 
consider a North-South Model
7, which is a multi-sectoral model. In a world formed by 
interdependent economies, balance of payments constraints can reduce growth in less 
competitive countries. Balance of payments constraints reflect the lack of demand for the 
goods produced in these countries, which are unable to keep or expand their market 
shares in both the domestic and international economies. The link between 
competitiveness and long term, demand-led growth can be formally expressed through 
the following equations in a North-South model: 
                                                 
5 For Sala-i-Martin (1996), a cross-country analysis from 1960 to 1990 showed that poor countries have not 
grown faster than rich ones.  
6 See Slaughter (1997) for a detailed discussion about the FPE and FPC problems. 
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Where X and M stand for the South volume of exports and imports, respectively, Z is 
world income, Y is the South income, Ps/Pn.E is the relative price in the South and 
North (denominated in the South currency, with E representing the nominal exchange 
rate), ψ ψ ψ ψ and ν ν ν ν are the price-elasticity of demand for exports and imports, respectively, ε ε ε ε is 
the income elasticity of the demand for exports, and π π π π is the income elasticity of the 
demand for imports in the South. 
If one logarithmically differentiates the demand equations for exports (1) and 
imports (2), and assumes that in equilibrium the rates of growth of the value of exports 
and imports should be equal, as stated in equation (3), the result shown in equation (4) is 
obtained. Small letters in equations (3), (4) and (5) represent the proportional rates of 
growth of the variables. 
Equation (5) expresses the path of constrained growth, where ys* is the 
proportional rate of income growth in the South compatible with balance of payments 
equilibrium, and ps-pn-e is the proportional rate of change of relative prices 
(denominated in the domestic currency). Assuming that purchasing power parity applies, 









This result (referred to in the literature as the "Thirlwall's Law") can be seen as a 
very simple model of convergence and divergence. For income convergence to occur,  9 
ys*/z should be higher than unity (i.e., income should grow in the South at higher rates 
than in the rest of the world), and therefore ε ε ε ε should exceed π π π π. The values of ε ε ε ε and π π π π 
depend on what McCombie and Thirlwall have called "non-price competitiveness", 
related to the quality of the goods produced and to the system of exports financing. 
The Thirlwall's Law is consistent with the Keynesian view of growth being 
determined by effective demand, which in an open economy depends, in turn, on the 
country's international competitiveness. On the other hand, as observed by Faberberg 
(1988), the elasticities of demand for exports and imports remain like a "black box" in the 
Thirlwall's model. In particular, for being an one-sector model, it losses a key point 
stressed by the structuralist tradition: elasticities are related to different patterns of 
international specialization as much as to the quality of the goods or the credit system for 
exports. New opportunities and gains from trade arise with industrial diversification, 
which broadens the scope for intra-industry trade. This is in turn related to structural 
change and to the Schumpeterian process of "creative destruction" based on technological 
change. 
In other words, Keynesian demand-led growth should be related to Schumpeterian 
structural change in order to explain long-term growth.  
 
IV - Income and Structural Convergence: The Experience of ABU, 1963-1995 
 
In order to study the relationship between structural and income convergence in 
Latin America, two indexes were constructed. The first one was the Income Convergence 
Index (IC), defined as IC(j) = GDP(j) / GDP(four), where GDP(four) is the average real 
per capita ( p.c.) GDP of four advanced countries (France, Germany, The United 
Kingdom, and The United States) and GDP(j) is the real GDP p.c. of the country studied, 
where (j) stands for Argentina, Brazil or Uruguay. The higher this index, the lower the 
income distance between these countries and the advanced economies. The evolution of 




  10 
The second index constructed was the Cross-Country Structural Change Index 
(CCSjn), which is intended to measure the difference in the economic structure between 
two countries, a country "j" (which represents Argentina, Brazil or Uruguay) and a 
developed country "n" (which represents one of the advanced economies mentioned 
above). This index is defined as follows: 
 
(1)  ∑ − =
i
in ij jn X X CCS  
 
Where Xij is the participation of industry "i" in the total value added of the manufacturing 
sector of country "j", and Xin is the participation of the same industry in the total value 
added of the manufacturing sector of country "n". The index is computed by summing up 
the difference in this participation (in absolute values) for all industries "i". It is clear that 
the higher the index CCSjn, the higher the difference between "j" and "n" in terms of the 
composition of the manufacturing sector
8. The CCSjn index provides a measure of the 
degree of similarity in the sectoral composition of manufacturing and thus offers some 
idea of the quality of the investment effort
9. The evolution of the CCSjn index is 
presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4 in the Appendix. 
The observation of the evolution through time of both indexes suggests the 
following "stylized facts":  
(a) Brazil displayed a relatively high rate of income and structural convergence 
with the developed countries until 1980. Thereafter, this country tended to diverge in 
terms of both indexes.  
(b) Argentina and Uruguay showed structural convergence until the early 
seventies, but this trend was rather weak and unable to check income divergence. In the 
late seventies and eighties, both structural and income divergence accelerated. As a 
                                                 
8 The raw data for computing the CCSjn index was obtained from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database, 
which presents information on the structure of the manufacturing sector at a three-digit level for 1963-
1991. 
9 The quality of investment seems to play a role at least as important as its quantity in enhancing 
economic growth.      11 
result, these countries exhibited income divergence for most of the period, associated 
with structural divergence or very slow structural convergence. 
(c) The correlation matrix of these variables provides a preliminary confirmation 
of the existence of an association between income and structural convergence. It can be 
seen in tables 5, 6 and 7 that the correlation coefficients between the income gap and the 
structural gap for each pair of countries display high negative values in the case of Brazil 
and Uruguay
10. This was true for each country individually, as well as for the sum of the 
CCSC indexes with respect to three advanced countries (France, Germany and the UK). 
However, this relationship was the opposite of what was expected in the case of 
Argentina and the UK. Moreover, the correlation coefficient of the income gap with the 
sum of the CCSC indexes between Argentina and the three advanced countries was not 
significant. Therefore, while the hypotheses of a positive association between structural 
change and income convergence found support in the experience of Brazil and Uruguay, 
it fails in the case of Argentina. 
 
V - Industrial Policy and Structural Change 
11 
 
The previous discussion addressed how factors related to the economic structure 
of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay affected the long-term economic performance of these 
countries. Still, structural change is closely related to institutional change. It is the 
interaction between these two sets of variables that shapes economic performance in the 
long term.   
The empirical evidence presented in the last section suggested that convergence in 
industrial structures and convergence in income levels were positively correlated in the 
period studied. In this section it will be argued that industrial policy in Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay played a key role in explaining the differences among these countries in 
terms of structural change and convergence. A very broad definition of industrial policy 
                                                 
10 The value found for this correlation was yet rather low in the case of Uruguay and the UK.   
11 Part of this discussion was based on Bertola, Bittencourt and Porcile (1998).  12 
will be used, including all governmental measures that can affect the allocation of 
resources across the different sectors of the economy. 
The main point to be developed is that industrial policy in Brazil was much more 
consistent, continuous and comprehensive than in Argentina and Uruguay. This 
contributed to explain the higher rate of structural change in Brazil. 
The late fifties witnessed the implantation of new capital-intensive industries in 
Argentina and Brazil, led by the metal-mechanical (especially vehicles) and the chemical 
industries (the so-called second phase of import-substitution, ISI-2). As shown in the 
previous section, the direction of structural change was similar in both countries, but the 
intensity of this process was rather different. This can in part be explained by the 
effectiveness of industrial policy. The design and implementation of industrial policy was 
carried out in very different political and institutional conditions in Brazil and this had an 
impact of industrial development
12.  
As Fishlow (1990) pointed out, the import substitution policy in Brazil was 
compatible with accelerated industrialization and high rates of aggregate growth. Its share 
of regional income increased from 43 to 54 % during 1953 to 1973 period. The share of 
regional income going to Argentina declined from 27 to 19 %. 
In Brazil, industrial deepening was carried out in the framework of Kubitschek's 
Plano de Metas (Targets Plan) that during five years provided consistent support for 
industrial development, including subsidies and closed markets for new industries
13. The 
domestic political environment was always favourable to the "developmentalist" project, 
which was pushed forward even when mounting disequilibria in the domestic and 
                                                 
12 For a comparison of the institutional and political environment in Argentina and Brazil in this period, 
see Sikkink (1991) 
13 The implementation of the Targets Plan was in charge of the so-called "Executive Groups", ad hoc 
bodies that managed specific areas in development planning, like autos, agricultural machinery, naval 
construction, heavy machinery, transportation and railways. These Executive Groups operated with 
considerable autonomy and were quite effective in overcoming bureaucratic resistance, as they were 
formed by representatives from the various governmental agencies. An especially important role was 
played by the GEIA (Executive Group of the Automobile Industry), which offered significant benefits 
(exchange rate and tariff exemptions for imports of inputs and machinery, tax rebates and subsidized 
official credits by the Bank of Brazil and the National Development Bank) in exchange of a certain level of 
"nationalization" of the components of the car. The National Development Bank (BNDES), in turn, was an 
important player in the coordination of the investment efforts in the public and private sector (Leopoldi, 
1991).   13 
external front became evident. There was a broad consensus in Brazil as regards the need 
of rapid industrial growth, which sustained the "developmentalist" coalition
14. 
Conversely, in Argentina ISI-2 was conflictive and traumatic, haunted by political 
instability. President Frondizi himself believed that he had at most a couple of years to 
advance his industrial projects
15. By mid-1959 the Frondizi administration had already 
been checked by domestic political opposition. He then adopted a severe stabilization 
plan that led to a sharp contraction of the economy and halted the "developmentalist" bias 
of his government
16. Two years later, Frondizi was deposed by a military rebellion, 
resulting in growing political conflict and economic downfall. 
These differences in the institutional environment in which ISI-2 took place in 
Argentina and Brazil were not inconsequential. Their effects were clearly reflected in the 
average rate of investment in 1956-61, significantly higher in Brazil than in Argentina
17.  
According to Taylor (1992), external dependence on foreign capital was also 
crucial in Argentina, because of the scarcity of domestic capital, which resulted in large 
part from demographic constraints on domestic savings. A high dependency rate, driven 
by a fast-growing population and substantial immigration, gave rise to an age structure 
with a large share of young consumers. The shortfall in available resources to be invested 
had to be made by capita inflows.  
It should be observed that it is not being suggested that the industrial policy then 
adopted by Brazil was "ideal" in any sense. Other policy alternatives could have avoided 
so high levels of protection and macroeconomic instability. But given the policy strategy 
that both countries adopted - the deepening of ISI - it is clear that Brazil pursuit this 
objective in a more consistent manner. And this had an impact on the relative success of 
the strategy in each country. Once again, the path-dependence matters. 
                                                 
14 On the political conditions of the Targets Plan see Benevides (1976). 
15 See Szusterman (1993). 
16 See Petrecolla (1989).  
17 A qualitative effect whose importance for industrial policy in subsequent years is difficult to assess has 
to do with the perception that both countries held about the value and significance of the concentrated 
industrialization effort of the late fifties. While in Brazil the Kubitschek's period is looked at proudly, as a 
phase of "heroic" industrialization and stable democracy, in Argentina the Frondizi's period has been 
haunted by controversy and criticism. See on this Sikkink (1991).  14 
The case of Uruguay was different from that of her two big neighbours. Clearly, 
in this case, there was no place for industrial policies of the kind adopted in Brazil. 
Uruguay's rather narrow domestic market did not allow for a strategy of deepening 
import-substituting industrialization. The advance of ISI would have implied a much 
higher cost in terms of inefficiency than in Argentina and Brazil. Therefore, the only 
avenue opened for Uruguay was to diversify her exports in order to enter more dynamic 
international markets, in sectors with higher value added. 
In the forties and fifties, the export structure of Uruguay was reoriented towards 
wool products and some agricultural products exported. A system of multiple exchange 
rates was adopted in order to encourage the industrialization of primary goods, including 
wool. But this strategy was challenged by the persistence of protectionist barriers on 
temperate agricultural goods in the USA and Europe and by the US tax applied on the 
Uruguayan exports of wool products
18. Thus, Uruguay's competitive advantage remained 
in sectors facing increasing barriers in the international economy, which lessened the 
income elasticity of her exports. Moreover, domestic policies discouraged exports. The 
overvaluation of the exchange rate and high industrial protection during the "neo-
batllista" period compromised the growth of exports. Only in the mid-seventies would 
Uruguay implement a new and more successful drive towards export diversification.   
The divergence in industrial policy between Argentina and Brazil became 
especially apparent in the second half of the seventies. While in the fifties Argentina and 
Brazil moved in the same direction (although with a different degree of success), in the 
second half of the seventies they moved in completely opposite directions. 
In 1974, Brazil adopted a specially ambitious program of industrial development, 
the II PND (Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento), aimed at implementing a new set of 
capital (and technology) intensive industries, mainly in the intermediate and capital goods 
sectors
19. This move was prompted by the 1973 oil crisis and sought to "complete" the 
industrial matrix through a new wave of import-substituting industrialization. In addition, 
Brazil attempted to diversify her export structure by increasing manufactured exports, 
                                                 
18 The USA argued that the Uruguayan system of multiple exchange rates represented an implicit subsidy 
for wool exports to the US market. 
19 See Barros de Castro e Souza (1985).  15 
especially to other Third-World countries. As a result, the import coefficient of the 
economy was further reduced, while the export coefficient increased. 
    In order to achieve this objective, a comprehensive array of policy measures was 
adopted, which included financial subsidies for the new industries, stricter import 
restrictions (based largely on non-tariff barriers, managed by the CACEX in Brazil) and 
subsidies to manufactured exports, combined with an active diplomacy towards 
developing countries in Africa, the Middle-East and Latin America
20. The abundance of 
foreign capital was then instrumental in broadening the degree of autonomy that Brazil 
needed to finance his new industrial projects. As already discussed, this industrialization 
drive of Brazil succeeded in promoting the convergence of his industrial structure with 
respect to that of the industrialized countries.   
As Brazil, Argentina used the relative abundance of foreign loans to set forward 
an ambitious programme for industrial restructuring. But its direction was the opposite to 
that of Brazil. Argentina sought to regain competitiveness by dismounting her system of 
industrial protection and by increasing exports based on static comparative advantages
21. 
In addition, the exchange rate was managed in accordance with the so-called "monetary 
approach to the balance of payments", with devaluation occurring at a pre-announced 
declining rate. This led to a combination of overvaluation of the exchange rate with trade 
openness that severely affected the competitive capacity of the Argentine industry
22. The 
experience ended in a deep recession.  
The drastic contraction of the metal-mechanical industries halted the previous 
process of slow cumulative industrial learning. Except for a few cases, which comprised 
industries intensive in energy and natural resources, no industry received special support, 
as the policy was explicitly aimed at providing a neutral environment from the point of 
view of factors allocation
23. At the same time, no new export-oriented sector came up to 
                                                 
 
20 However, trade relations with Argentina were restrained as a result of an enduring diplomatic conflict 
related to geopolitical rivalry and the construction of the Itaipu dam. In addition, Brazil strengthened its 
diplomatic and economic links with Europe, especially with Germany, in order to set forward its nuclear 
project.  
21 See Katz and Kosacoff  (1989).
 
22 See Kosacoff (1992).
 
23 See Aspiazu (1989).
  16 
play the leading role in economic growth that the metal-mechanical industries had 
formerly played. 
The contrasting experiences in industrial transformation of Argentina and Brazil 
ended with the 1982 debt crisis. Both countries had followed policies that compromised 
(for different reasons) competitiveness and external equilibrium. In the case of Brazil, the 
array of subsidies provided by the ISI-2 represented an additional source of tension as the 
government faced a growing fiscal deficit. Moreover, both policies had been sustained on 
the basis of the external debt. The increase of the international interest rates in the early 
eighties launched a financial crisis, put an end to the policies of the seventies and opened 
up "the lost decade", which was characterized by large resource transfers, high real 
interest rates, large deficits financed by internal debts, accelerating inflation and 
economic stagnation. 
 
VI - Conclusions 
 
This work analyzed the impact of structural change on economic growth in 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. We presented empirical evidence suggesting that income 
convergence and structural convergence were associated in the post-II World War period, 
although this evidence was not conclusive in the case of Argentina.  
Finally, the differences in industrial and economic policies in Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay may have contributed to explain the intensity of the process of structural 
change in these countries. Institutional and structural changes occurred together. In this 
respect, the ABU countries exhibited a different ability to reshape their institutions with a 
view to encouraging industrial transformation. The Brazilian industrial policy seems to 
have been more efficient in promoting structural convergence than her neighbors, and 
this was reflected in the different performance achieved by these countries in the 
international economy. 
  The discussion about a higher degree of state intervention and/or liberalization in 
these countries is still being debated. The deficit problems in Latin America and its 
consequences permit no easy solution. The debt crises of the 1980s have underlined the 
fragility of the state and its inability to respond to the less favorable external  17 
environment. According to Fishlow (1990), the issue is not merely debt reduction but 
redesigning the Latin American state. Macroeconomic equilibrium, as recently has been 
achieved in Brazil since 1994’s Real Plan, once achieved, will not by itself guarantee 
economic development.  
  Restarting and sustaining economic growth is where the public sector has a 
central and critical role. To perform that role effectively requires a new coalition of 
political support that is founded on much reduced external finance and need for larger 
domestic saving, especially of the public sector itself; an expanded, but more 
competitive, international market in manufactured products, based upon diffusion of 
technology and imports of capital goods; limits on the domestic tax base; and 
unacceptably high income inequality throughout the region. Political transformation is 
very much a component of redesigning of the state; democratization is only the 
beginning
24. 
It could be performed a formal test to assess whether a model of growth with 
balance of payments constraints is consistent with the ABU growth experience from 
1963. In this model, we could include the effects of structural change on the basic North-
South Model, described in the section III. As a future study, it would be important to 
empirically estimate this model trying to identify the direct influence of international 
trade on the income convergence, since here we have just analyzed an indirect effect of 
trade through the structural changes occurred in the industry. 
 
 
                                                 
24  See Fishlow (1990) for more details.  18 
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Table 1: Income per capita distance with respect to four advanced countries. Ratio of the 
Index of the Real Per Capita Income: ABU / Four Advanced Countries 1900=100 
 
 
Year Argentina Brazil Uruguay Year Argentina Brazil Uruguay 
1960  57  163 72  1975  51 215 52 
1961  59  167 69  1976  48 223 51 
1962  54  167 67  1977  48 220 49 
1963  50  159 63  1978  45 215 50 
1964  52  152 62  1979  47 219 51 
1965  54  144 56  1980  49 233 55 
1966  51  142 57  1981  46 217 55 
1967  51  145 54  1982  42 217 50 
1968  51  153 52  1983  42 201 43 
1969  52  153 53  1984  41 198 40 
1970  52  162 54  1985  37 204 40 
1971  52  173 53  1986  38 212 42 
1972  50  182 50  1987  38 208 46 
1973  49  193 48  1988  34 195 43 
1974  51  208  49      
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Table 2: Cross-Country Index of structural change for Argentina 
 
 
Year   AR-BR  AR-FR  AR-GER  AR-UK 
1963  0.5489  0.53757 0.66539 0.68958 
1964  0.55312 0.49352 0.60642 0.61744 
1965  0.54553 0.48876 0.60389 0.60289 
1966  0.54744 0.50432 0.60553 0.62698 
1967  0.53657 0.51591 0.59718 0.63609 
1968  0.50213 0.5023 0.59585  0.63082 
1969  0.44835 0.48247 0.60262 0.60364 
1970  0.43242 0.48687 0.60191  0.6067 
1971 0.42758  0.45423  0.5854  0.581 
1972  0.40732 0.44338 0.57053 0.54194 
1973  0.3793  0.46006 0.56983 0.55258 
1974  0.33747 0.50115 0.58701 0.52921 
1975  0.34379 0.4412 0.57276  0.51361 
1976  0.37201 0.47869 0.59759 0.55352 
1977  0.31164 0.4297 0.56416  0.52447 
1978  0.35222 0.43527 0.57818 0.54364 
1979  0.33737 0.42592 0.54935 0.53119 
1980  0.43912 0.48351 0.59044 0.55807 
1981  0.38178 0.51288 0.62851 0.55938 
1982  0.38632 0.50053 0.63564 0.56468 
1983  0.31656 0.49715 0.62915 0.53398 
1984  0.30189 0.45891 0.59146 0.51435 
1985  0.32627 0.46843 0.63916 0.54093 
1986  0.36955 0.47044 0.64185 0.52516 
1987  0.34015 0.48451 0.62119  0.5013 
1988  0.33969 0.51833 0.65655 0.54161 
1989  0.39191  0.55749 0.7039 0.58697 
1990  0.4039  0.74313 0.61657 0.63541 
1991    0.38727 0.60855 0.73022 0.61371 
Source: Elaborated from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Data Bank. The Cross-Country Structural Change 
Index is calculated as the sum of the differences (in absolute values), for each pair of countries, in the 
participation of each industrial branch in the total value added of the manufacturing sector. Value added for 
early years calculated on the basis of the Index of Industrial Production of each industrial branch according 
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Table 3: Cross-Country Index of structural change for Brazil 
 
 
Year BR-FR  BR-GER  BR-UK 
1963  0.56315 0.7133 0.59917 
1964 0.5389  0.69826  0.58903 
1965  0.49944 0.66437 0.55861 
1966  0.42811 0.59992 0.49249 
1967  0.42112 0.59236 0.50398 
1968 0.37855  0.61044  0.5161 
1969  0.29934 0.55104 0.44125 
1970  0.29189 0.58617 0.45967 
1971  0.23532 0.56782 0.44463 
1972  0.21467 0.53647 0.40653 
1973  0.24013 0.53133 0.39529 
1974 0.28293  0.51092  0.4005 
1975  0.25173 0.49774 0.40279 
1976  0.2447 0.47829 0.3987 
1977  0.20377 0.4734 0.38861 
1978  0.19663 0.47314 0.42292 
1979 0.2169  0.47356  0.41074 
1980  0.24215 0.49436 0.43659 
1981 0.2388  0.55411  0.44784 
1982 0.2853  0.60826  0.494 
1983  0.26995 0.61201 0.49538 
1984 0.25582  0.58553  0.4774 
1985  0.24254 0.57305 0.46148 
1986  0.19103 0.52502 0.43546 
1987 0.21861  0.53831  0.4335 
1988  0.21329 0.53423 0.44058 
1989  0.22206 0.52964 0.44231 
1990  0.23763 0.56018 0.46112 
1991  0.23673 0.57978 0.44212 
Source: Elaborated from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Data Bank. The Cross-Country Structural Change 
Index is calculated as the sum of the differences (in absolute values), for each pair of countries, in the 
participation of each industrial branch in the total value added of the manufacturing sector. Value added for 
early years calculated on the basis of the Index of Industrial Production of each industrial branch according 
to the UNIDO statistics, taking the value added of 1990 as the reference. 
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Table 4: Cross-Country Index of structural change for Uruguay 
 
 
Year UR-FR  UR-GER  UR-UK 
1963  0.60388 0.83159 0.86742 
1964  0.58372 0.81441 0.83192 
1965  0.60454 0.83351 0.86855 
1966  0.65708 0.85295 0.91995 
1967  0.64091 0.7938 0.89178 
1968  0.67555 0.85006 0.91498 
1969  0.67328 0.86347 0.88855 
1970  0.70584 0.87097 0.88073 
1971  0.67396 0.83958 0.83075 
1972  0.69924 0.85843 0.85347 
1973 0.70516  0.85664  0.8458 
1974  0.78025 0.89528 0.88404 
1975  0.78413 0.91599 0.89019 
1976  0.80329 0.91728 0.88247 
1977 0.76669  0.9054  0.8502 
1978 0.7405  0.89189  0.83621 
1979  0.67669 0.83345 0.76148 
1980  0.68057 0.81534 0.73839 
1981  0.72887 0.88804 0.77257 
1982  0.75335 0.9483 0.81925 
1983 0.82797  1.03033  0.9036 
1984  0.79578 0.99535 0.88479 
1985  0.78175 1.00714 0.88963 
1986  0.72396 0.95911 0.83129 
1987 0.70102  0.89698  0.7708 
1988  0.75272 0.9293 0.82565 
1989  0.78542 0.95642 0.85531 
1990  0.77346 0.94437 0.83126 
1991  0.75714 0.94048 0.80843 
Source: Elaborated from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Data Bank. The Cross-Country Structural Change 
Index is calculated as the sum of the differences (in absolute values), for each pair of countries, in the 
participation of each industrial branch in the total value added of the manufacturing sector. Value added for 
early years calculated on the basis of the Index of Industrial Production of each industrial branch according 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix for Brazil 
 
 GapB  BR-FR  BR-GER  BR-UK 
GapB  1.000     
BR-FR -0.7636  1.000     
BR-GER -0.7182  0.8499 1.000   
BR-UK -0.6600  0.8879  0.9491  1.000 
BRM  -0.7528     




Table 6: Correlation matrix for Argentina 
 
 GapA  AR-FR  AR-GER  AR-UK 
GapA 1.000      
AR-FR -0.02622  1.000     
AR-GER -0.5252  0.7390  1.000   
AR-UK 0.5507  0.5988  0.2646  1.000 
ARM 0.1108       




Table 7: Correlation matrix for Uruguay 
 
 GapU  UR-FR  UR-GER  UR-UK 
GapU  1.000     
UR-FR -0.7452  1.000     
UR-GER -0.7999  0.8392 1.000   
UR-UK -0.04302  0.1484  0.2191  1.000 
URM  -0.7178     




Key to the variables 
gap = (per capita GDPn) / (per capita GDP four advanced countries); 
AR-FR, AR-GER, AR-UK, BR-FR, BR-GER, BR-UK, UR-FR, UR-GER, UR-UK: 
Cross Country Structural Change Index, in which the structure of the manufacturing 
sector of each ABU country is compared with that of an advanced country (France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom).  
 
Source: Elaborated from the Unido Industrial Statistics Data Bank. The data for the 
manufacturing sector is computed at a 3-digit level of aggregation. 